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NOTES
POST-McNALLY REVIEW OF INVALID CONVICTIONS
THROUGH THE WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS
INTRODUCTION
The writ of coram nobis,1 a post-conviction remedy granted by the
court that rendered the original judgment of conviction, vacates the con-
viction or grants a new trial.' To be granted a writ of coram nobis, the
petitioner must allege an error which was not previously litigated,3 which
was not ascertainable through ordinary diligence at the time of the trial,4
and which probably would have affected its outcome.' The petitioner
must also explain any delay in discovering the facts or in filing his peti-
tion, and must assert the unavailability of any other remedy.6 Originally
limited to errors of fact,7 the writ's modem application has principally
addressed errors of law discovered when the petitioner is no longer in
custody and therefore cannot avail himself of the writ of habeas corpus."
The writ of coram nobis has recently re-emerged in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States,9 which overturned
the doctrine that loss of intangible rights, rather than simple loss of tan-
gible property rights, was cognizable as mail fraud and wire fraud. 10
Under that doctrine, certain intangible interests-such as the right to
faithful service or honest government-were protected in ways otherwise
1. For discussions of the writ ofcoram nobis and its lengthy history, see generally 18
Am. Jur. 2d Coram Nobis § 1 (1985); E. Frank, Coram Nobis §§ 1.01-1.04, at 1-10(1953); L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies §§ 7-9, at 29-41 (1981); Freedman, The Writ
of Error Coram Nobis, 3 Temp. L.Q. 365 (1929); Note, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis,
37 Harv. L. Rev. 744 (1924); Comment, Writ of Error Coram Nobis, I 1 Wis. L. Rev. 248
(1936); Fuld, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 117 N.Y.L.L 2212 (June 5, 1947).
Although this Note is concerned with the federal writ of coram nobis, it should be
noted that the so-called common-law writ of error coram nobis has, until recently, served
as a principal post-conviction remedy in state courts, along with the writ of habeas
corpus. See E. Frank, supra §§ 6.01-6.05, at 114-36 (1953); L. Yackle, supra §§ 7-13, at
29-69 (1981); Cohen, Post-Conviction Relief in the New York Court ofAppeals: New Wine
and Broken Bottles, 35 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 2-6 (1968).
2. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 8, at 33-34.
3. See id. at 31.
4. See id. at 31-32.
5. See id. at 32; see also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)
(coram nobis petition properly granted only when court concludes that undisclosed evi-
dence would have permitted defendant to raise reasonable doubt as to his guilt).
6. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Coram Nobis § 35, at 660-61 (1985).
7. See E. Frank, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 3.
8. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Coram Nobis § 2, at 623 (1985). For a discussion of the
custody requirement of habeas corpus and its inapplicability in the context of coram
nobis, see infra notes 29, 65 and accompanying text.
9. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
10. See id. at 360-61.
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reserved for tangible property rights." McNally held the intangible
rights doctrine inapplicable to mail fraud and wire fraud in the absence
of clear legislative intent.12
In the aftermath of McNally, some individuals who had been convicted
of mail fraud or wire fraud under the intangible rights doctrine, and had
completed their sentences, petitioned for writs of coram nobis.'3 A ques-
tion then arose concerning whether, and under what standards, it is
proper for a federal court to issue a writ of coram nobis if the sentence
resulting from conviction has already been served.
Circuit courts have developed two contrasting tests for the issuance of
the writ after completion of a sentence. The Seventh Circuit requires
that the petitioner be under a continuing civil disability 4 which is
"unique to criminal convictions."' 5 A variation of this approach also
requires a continuing civil disability, but does not stipulate that the disa-
bility be unique to a criminal conviction. 16 In contrast, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has developed a more liberal standard, finding that the writ of coram
11. See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989). These cases were prosecuted under the federal mail fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
12. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 360-61. Significantly, Congress amended the mail fraud
and wire fraud statutes in November 1988 by adding section 1346, which makes loss of
intangible rights cognizable as mail fraud and wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West
Supp. 1990).
13. Numerous verdicts were revised in the wake of the McNally decision. See, eg.,
Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (insurance company);
United States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1989) (flight training school operator);
Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989) (taxi licenses); United States v.
Davis, 873 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1989) (real estate developer), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 292
(1989); United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (former governor), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989); United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1988)
(pension fund trustees), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989); United States v. Dadanian,
856 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1988) (gambling license); United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483
(3d Cir. 1988) (racketeering), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 836 (1989); United States v. Shelton,
848 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (county commissioners); United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d
36 (2d Cir. 1988) (arms dealer); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1988)
(building permit); Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988) (municipal election);
United States v. Huls, 841 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) (oil lease); United States v. Holzer,
840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988) (state judge), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988); United
States v. Baldinger, 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1988) (scheme to defraud); United States v.
Italiano, 837 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1988) (bribing county official); United States v. Covino,
837 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1988) (bribery); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.
1988) (bingo permit), cert. denied, 109 S. CL 307 (1989); United States v. Herron, 825
F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1987) (money laundering); United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1987) (bulk mailing service); United States v. Ferrara, 701 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(medical licenses), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1268 (1988).
14. A continuing civil disability is the present and future impairment of some civil
right, such as the right to vote or to maintain an occupational license. See United States
v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989); see also
L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 51, at 226-29 (circumstances justifying coram nobis
jurisdiction).
15. Keane, 852 F.2d at 203.
16. See United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 236 (1989).
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nobis is appropriate unless the petitioner is guilty of the crime "as...
charged in the indictment."1
This Note examines the criteria under which a writ of coram nobis
may issue when the petitioner's criminal sentence has already been com-
pleted. Part I reviews the history of the writ of coram nobis, from its
evolution in English common law to its present application in the United
States. Part II discusses the doctrine of intangible rights and the coram
nobis issues raised in the aftermath of the McNally decision. Part II also
analyzes the conflicting criteria for the issuance of the writ of coram
nobis set forth by the various United States Courts of Appeals. Part III
concludes that a petitioner's desire to have his record cleared must be
weighed against the government's interest in the finality of judgment.
The writ of coram nobis should be issued only where the indictment
under which the petitioner was convicted failed to state a crime and the
petitioner has exhausted his rights of appeal.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS
The British common-law writ of coram nobis evolved in the sixteenth
century as a remedy for petitioners alleging a judicial wrong.18 Applied
in both civil and criminal cases,19 the writ was brought before the court
that had rendered the original judgment, and requested relief in the form
of a new trial.2" In order to obtain the writ, the petitioner had to allege
an error of fact21 which could not have been ascertained through ordi-
nary diligence at the time of the trial,2 and which, in all probability,
would have affected its outcome.3 As a result, a fact that had been liti-
gated could not again be brought before the court, even if the law had
changed.24
The writ of coram nobis was traditionally brought before the trial
court to correct an error of fact which did not appear on the record.25 In
17. United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3190 (1989).
18. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 9, at 36-37. The petition was submitted in the court
of the King's Bench, or "before us," that is, before the King. See id. § 9, at 37. The writ
of coram vobis, an analogous procedure, was heard by the judges of the Court of Common
Pleas, or "before you." See id. Although the latter term has occasionally been used in
the United States, see, e-g., United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (1914), the distinction
is virtually meaningless in the American context. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 9, at 38-
39.
19. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 8, at 31.
20. See id. § 9, at 37.
21. In early practice, errors of fact could be remedied only through the writ of coram
nobis, see id. § 8, at 32-33, while the writ of habeas corpus was reserved for errors of law.
See id. § 3, at 4. In modern practice, habeas corpus is the remedy for errors of law when
the petitioner is still in custody. The writ of coram nobis may address errors of either fact
or law when the petitioner has completed his sentence. See id. § 8, at 33.
22. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 8, at 31-32.
23. See id. § 8, at 32.
24. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Coram Nobis § 10, at 630 (1985).
25. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 6.
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its modem application, the writ alleges an error of fact or law, and is
invoked when the petitioner is no longer imprisoned on that charge.2 6 It
may thus be distinguished from a writ of habeas corpus,2 7 which alleges
an apparent error of law and is addressed to a higher tribunal.2" The
writ of habeas corpus challenges the legal right to continue to hold a
petitioner in custody.29
Traditionally available in both civil and criminal cases,3 the writ of
coram nobis has rarely achieved prominence in American federal prac-
tice.3 Chief Justice Marshall first recognized the availability of the writ
in 1810.32 Nearly fifty years later, however, the Circuit Court of Massa-
chusetts held in United States v. Plumer33 that the federal circuit courts
had no jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis in criminal cases.34
.Plumer nonetheless acknowledged that the writ had been used and was
appropriate in rare civil cases.35
The Supreme Court'struggled with the writ of coram nobis into the
twentieth century. In Bronson v. Schulten,36 the Court disapproved of
26. See L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 36, at 165; see also United States v. Morgan, 346
U.S. 502, 511-13 (1954) (coram nobis relief available after release from custody).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988). For the relation between the writs of habeas corpus and
coram nobis, see United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976): "Even if
§ 2255 were unavailable to [petitioner], in view of the fact that he had fully served his
sentence under a federal felony conviction, he could simply bring a petition for coram
nobis under the 'All Writs' statute .... because such relief is available from the sentenc-
ing court even after release from custody." Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
28. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Coram Nobis § 2, at 623 (1985).
29. See id.; see also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950) ("The writ of habeas
corpus commands general recognition as the essential remedy to safeguard a citizen
against imprisonment by State or Nation in violation of his constitutional rights.") (over-
ruled on other grounds by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)).
The custody requirement, though crucial to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, is
interpreted extremely broadly. "Simply put, the requirement of 'custody' identifies those
restraints upon individual liberty that are severe enough to justify the exercise of the
extraordinary federal habeas jurisdiction." L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 42, at 178. See also
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (petitioner released on bail pending
appeal "in custody" for habeas purposes); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (peti-
tioner's parole did not render habeas petition moot); Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus,
60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991, 1001-02 (1985) (review of custody criteria).
30. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Coram Nobis § 3, at 623 (1985).
31. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
In the various states, the writ is either available under the common law, expressly
abolished by statute, or impliedly displaced through the provision of other remedies. See
L. Yackle, supra note 1, §§ 10-13, at 41-69. For a history of the writ in federal practice,
see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506-11. This Note addresses the writ in
federal practice.
32. See Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 23 F. Cas. 236, 236-37 (C.C.D.V. 1810) (No.
13,537).
33. 27 Fed. Cas. 561 (C.C.D.M. 1859) (No. 16,056).
34. See id. at 571-73.
35. The writ of coram: nobis might be issued to correct "[e]rrors of fact in the process
of a civil action, or such as happened through the fault of the clerk in the record of the
proceedings." See id. at 572-73.
36. 104 U.S. 410 (1881).
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the trend in the states to award the writ,37 and expressed doubts as to the
writ's validity in the federal system.38 The Court repeated its doubts sev-
eral times during the next seventy years.39
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), adopted in 1946, abolished the
writ of coram nobis in civil cases." The rule provides that "[w]rits of
coram nobis [and] coram vobis... are abolished, and the procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action."41 Nonetheless, Rule 60(b) does
not abolish the writ of coram nobis in criminal questions.42
In United States v. Morgan,43 the Supreme Court finally held that fed-
eral courts could issue the writ of coram nobis in a criminal case in which
the petitioner challenged his conviction by claiming that he was not in-
formed of his right to counsel." While the Court agreed with earlier
opinions holding that the writ was not specifically authorized by any con-
gressional statute,45 it concluded that the writ was authorized by the All
Writs Act,46 which provides that "[tihe Supreme Court and all courts
37. See id. at 415-16.
38. See id. at 417. The Bronson Court identified narrow permissible criteria for issu-
ing the writ: error on the part of the court clerk or error as to a matter of fact, such as
the death of one of the parties before judgment, the defendant not being of age, or either
party being a married woman when suit was joined. See id. at 416; see also United States
v. Plumer, 27 F. Cas. 561, 573 (C.C.D.M. 1859) (No. 16,056) (listing same criteria).
39. In United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914), the Court again expressed concern
regarding federal court jurisdiction to issue the writ. See id. at 68-69. However, the
Court declined to decide whether the writ of coram nobis was available in criminal cases
in the district courts. See id. at 69.
In United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947), the Court reiterated its refusal to rule
upon the writ's availability in the federal system, but remarked on the apparently super-
fluous nature of the coram nobis remedy: "It is difficult to conceive of a situation in a
federal criminal case today where [the writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or appro-
priate." Id. at 475-76 n.4. The Court apparently had in mind the existence of federal
habeas corpus, and disregarded the possibility that the petitioner would no longer be in
custody, a circumstance in which relief would be warranted but would otherwise bejuris-
dictionally barred.
40. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting): "I am
unable to agree with the decision of the Court resurrecting the ancient writ of error
coram nobis from the limbo to which it presumably had been relegated by Rule 60(b)
Fed. R. Civ. P. and 28 U.S.C. § 2255." Id. at 513.
Rule 60(b) provides relief from judgment or order by reason of "mistake, inadvertence,
... excusable neglect,... newly discovered evidence,... fraud" or a voidjudgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
42. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505-06 n.4.
43. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
44. See id. at 511-12. In its 5-4 decision, the majority held that Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 35, which permits the correction of "an illegal sentence at any time," did
not apply when an authorized conviction was based upon the denial of constitutional
rights. See id. at 504-06.
45. See, eg., United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914) (state statutes relating to
granting of new trials not applicable to federal practice); United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed.
Cas. 561, 572 (C.C.D.M. 1859) (No. 16,056) (acts of Congress do not authorize re-exami-
nation of district court judgments).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
1990]
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established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropri-
ate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." 47
Morgan also stated that a writ of habeas corpus did not supersede the
writ of coram nobis: "Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find
any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon
their convictions."4 Morgan, however, identified the writ of coram nobis
as an "extraordinary remedy" to be issued "only under circumstances
compelling such action to achieve justice."'49
II. CoRAm NoBIs IN THE AFTERMATH OF MCNALLY
V. UNITED STATES
A. Post-McNally Petitions
In the 1970's, lower federal courts developed the theory of intangible
rights,"0 under which certain interests were considered analogous to
property rights." Under this reasoning, employers had an intangible in-
terest in faithful service, voters had an intangible interest in fair elections,
and citizens had an intangible interest in honest government.52
The primary vehicle for the development of the intangible rights doc-
trine was the federal mail fraud statute, 3 which sanctions individuals
who, "having devised or intend[ed] to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises," use the mails to further
their aims. 54 Public officials whose acts deprived citizens of their intangi-
47. Id.
48. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954) (quoting United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952)).
49. Id.
50. See, ag., United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976) (bribery); United
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974) (bribery and tax evasion), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (fraudulent voter
registration), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508
(7th Cir.) (kickbacks), cert denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
51. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356-57 (1987).
52. See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989); see, eg., Caldwell, 544 F.2d at 691 (honest government); United
States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400-01 (2d Cir. 1976) (honest and faithful service);
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) (honest government), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (fair elections), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.) (faithful
service), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973). But cf United States v. Regent Office Supply
Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) (mere fact of falseness of representations con-
nected with commercial transaction does not bring transaction within mail fraud statute,
absent actual injury to alleged victims).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1990).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1990). See gener-
ally Coffee, From Tort to Cime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary
Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117,
126-48 (1981) (undue expansion of mail fraud prosecution under intangible rights doc-
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ble rights were prosecuted and convicted for mail fraud.55
The Supreme Court invalidated the intangible rights doctrine in Mc-
Nally v. United States,56 ruling that Congress did not intend such a rem-
edy under the mail fraud statute. As a result, a number of individuals
who had completed their sentences after conviction under the intangible
rights doctrine applied for relief by writ of coram nobis. These petition-
ers sought to have their sentences vacated on the ground that the original
indictments, upon retroactive application of the McNally decision, failed
to state a crime.57
B. Criteria for Issuance of a Writ of Coram Nobis
The Supreme Court has restricted post-conviction review under a writ
of coram nobis to "errors... of the most fundamental character, that is,
such [that the error] rendered the proceeding itself irregular and inva-
trine); Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 Duq. L. Rev. 771 (1980)
(history of mail fraud statute).
55. See, eg., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1987) (budget director);
United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (party leader), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.) (state alcoholic beverage
commissioner), cert denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (congressman), cert denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v.
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (governor), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976) (city building commissioner); United States v. Bush,
522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (municipal director of public relations), cert denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (alderman), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974)
(alderman), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th
Cir.) (former governor and former director of department of revenue), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
Private defendants were also convicted under the mail fraud statute for schemes that
defrauded the public. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1987)
(bribing mayor); United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1984) (bribing dep-
uty in county assessor's office) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ginsburg,
773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc)); United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th
Cir. 1975) (bribing state secretary of state); United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380
(E.D. La. 1969) (bribing state officials).
56. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
57. See Allen v. United States, 867 F.2d 969, 971-72 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989); United
States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989);
United States v. Dadanian, 856 F.2d 1391, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Asher,
854 F.2d 1483, 1485 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 836 (1989); United States v.
Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 516
(1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Huls, 841 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1345 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988); United States
v. Baldinger, 838 F.2d 176, 178 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Italiano, 837 F.2d 1480,
1481 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 51 (5th Cir. 1987).
In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court resolved many of these
claims by holding that the mail fraud statute applied only to intangible property rights
and not to other intangible rights. Thus, a conviction which was based upon intent to
defraud an employer of an intangible property right-such as confidential business infor-
mation-was held not to be affected by the McNally decision. See id. at 23-24.
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lid.' 58 Although the Court has not established specific criteria for issu-
ance of the writ of coram nobis, it has suggested consequences that the
writ might properly mend: heavier penalties on subsequent convictions
or adverse effects on the petitioner's civil rights.5 9 The Court noted,
however, that the original proceedings are presumed correct and that the
burden of proving them otherwise rests upon the petitioner.'
The circuits disagree as to the standards and criteria to be applied in
determining when to issue a writ of coram nobis.
1. Continuing Civil Disability
Several circuits have required a continuing civil disability,61 such as
the loss of the right to vote or to maintain an occupational license,62 in
order to grant a writ of coram nobis.63 This requirement is based primar-
ily upon a comparison with the writ of habeas corpus,64 which is the
proper form of collateral review if the petitioner is still in federal custody
and thereby under a continuing deprivation.65 Because the justification
for habeas corpus ends with the completion of custody,66 the petitioner
for a writ of coram nobis must show a continuing civil disability that is
serious enough to substitute for the custody requirement.' The gov-
erning theory is that the writ of coram nobis should be reviewed under at
least as stringent a standard as the writ of habeas corpus. 8
The requirement that the petitioner suffer a continuing civil disability
meets this criterion. 9 The Seventh Circuit applied this standard in deny-
ing a writ of coram nobis where the petitioner, a lawyer who had been
disbarred as a result of his conviction, was not under a continuing civil
58. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914); see also United States v. Morgan,
346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954) (writ of coram nobis is an "extraordinary remedy" to be issued
"only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice").
59. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512-13.
60. See id. at 512.
61. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
62. See United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2109 (1989).
63. See United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 236 (1989); United
States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1059 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d
199, 202-03 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1989); Stoneman,
870 F.2d at 105-06; Keane, 852 F.2d at 203. For current interpretation of the habeas
corpus custody requirement, see L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 42, at 178-81; Yackle, supra
note 29, at 1001-02.
66. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1147 (7th Cir. 1989).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1147-48; United States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 236 (1989); United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1060 (3d Cir.
1988); United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1988) (Hall, J., dissenting),
cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989).
69. See United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 202-03 (7th Cir. 1988), cer denied,
109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989).
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disability because he had since been readmitted to his state bar. In
another case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the petitioner's inability
to attract a high-visibility public relations position did not constitute a
civil disability.71
Some decisions have required not only that there be a continuing civil
disability, but that the disability be "unique to criminal convictions." 72
Examples of such civil disabilities include loss of the right to vote, the
right to maintain an occupational license, or the right to bear arms.7" In
addition, the possibility that a criminal conviction may result in harsher
penalties for future criminal offenses may also be considered in determin-
ing the propriety of the writ.74 On the other hand, fines or loss of reputa-
tion do not meet the necessary standard because they might equally
result from a civil judgment.75
2. The Indictment Failed to State a Crime
Some decisions have established a more liberal test than the civil disa-
bility standard, holding that a writ of coram nobis is appropriate as long
as the petitioner is not guilty of the crime "as charged in the indict-
ment."' 76 Under this test, a court scrutinizes both the indictment and the
jury instructions to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an
act that is no longer considered a crime.77
In the wake of McNally v. United States,78 many mail fraud convic-
tions were overturned on the ground that the indictments did not state a
crime.7 9 The conclusion that the defendants' indictments had never, in
70. See id. at 203-04.
71. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 1989).
72. See United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (3d Cir. 1988); United States
v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989). A
disability unique to criminal convictions is one which could not stem from a civil judg-
ment. See Osser, 864 F.2d at 1059-60; Keane, 852 F.2d at 205.
At least one dissenting opinion has concluded that the requirement of continuing civil
disability rules out a writ of coram nobis where the sentence has already been served
because the injustice to the petitioner, though indisputable, is not continuing. See United
States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir. 1988) (Hall, J., dissenting), cerL denied,
109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989).
73. See Keane, 852 F.2d at 203.
74. See id. But see Osser, 864 F.2d at 1060 n.3 (declining to rule whether harsher
penalties constitute sufficient disability).
75. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1989); Keane, 852 F.2d
at 203; see also Osser, 864 F.2d at 1060 (loss of civil service pension due to conviction
equivalent to civil money judgment and therefore not sufficient ground for granting writ
of coram nobis); cf. L. Yackle, supra note 1, § 42, at 181 (fine alone not sufficient "cus-
tody" to invoke writ of habeas corpus).
76. United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3190 (1989); see United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989); Allen
v. United States, 867 F.2d 969, 972 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d
1171, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1974).
77. See Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1074.
78. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
79. See, eg., United States v. Price, 857 F.2d 234, 236 (4th Cir. 1988) (union offi-
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fact, charged a crime was held to meet the standard of fundamental error
necessary to issue the writ of coram nobis.s ' Decisions applying this test
will not review the evidence to determine whether the petitioner could
have been convicted of a crime for which he was not charged."1
Other decisions, however, have held the absence of a crime from the
indictment to be an insufficient basis to issue a writ of coram nobis.82 If
the defendant could have been convicted of a crime other than that
which was stated in the indictment, a writ of coram nobis should not be
cials); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 529 (1st Cir. 1988) (scheme to obtain building
permit); United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1345 (7th Cir.) (state judge), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988); United States v. Gordon, 836 F.2d 1312, 1313 (Ilth Cir.
1988) (election fraud), cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 28 (1988); United States v. Murphy, 836
F.2d 248, 251-52 (6th Cir.) (state bingo permit), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 307 (1988);
United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 622 (7th Cir. 1987) (tax evasion).
80. See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989).
81. See United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989); Allen v.
United States, 867 F.2d 969, 972 (6th Cir. 1989); Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1075; United States
v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1974).
Several courts have granted a writ of coram nobis, concluding that the indictment
under which the petitioner was convicted failed to state a crime. In Travers, for example,
the Second Circuit granted the writ because the defendant was convicted of mail fraud for
conduct later ruled by the Supreme Court to be outside the mail fraud statute. See Trmv-
ers, 514 F.2d at 1172. In granting the writ, the Travers court held that the decisive factor
was a strict construction of the terms of the indictment rather than the petitioner's con-
duct. See id. at 1178-79; cf. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (defendant's
credit card fraud held not within the mail fraud statute, since his use of the mails was
only incidental to the fraud, rather than '"'for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice"' (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1988))).
In Marcello, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioner's conviction had been
based exclusively upon the intangible rights doctrine. SeeMarcello, 876 F.2d at 1150-51.
In its view, the question was not whether, upon the facts, the indictment might have
stated charges which would survive McNally scrutiny, but whether the indictment actu-
ally had done so. See id. at 1152. Although the court stated that "[froram nobis is appro-
priate only where the petitioner can demonstrate that he is suffering civil disabilities as a
consequence of the criminal convictions and that the challenged error is of sufficient mag-
nitude to justify the extraordinary relief," id. at 1154, it nonetheless granted the writ
because the defendant must "be absolved of the consequences flowing from his branding
as a federal felon." Id.
In Allen v. United States, 867 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
writ of coram nobis and set aside a pre-McNally conviction for mail fraud under reason-
ing which implicitly followed the failure to state a crime test. In Allen, since the indict-
ment failed to specify that the state had been defrauded of a tangible or intangible
property right and the jury was not instructed that loss of a property interest was a
necessary element of mail fraud, the court determined that the petitioner had been con-
victed under the intangible rights theory. See id. at 971-72. The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that a property loss was implicit in the activities with which the
defendant was charged. See id. at 972. As a result, the court concluded that the indict-
ment and instructions "permitted a conviction for conduct not within the reach of the
mail fraud statute." Id. This, the court found, was sufficient to justify the issuance of a
writ of coram nobis. See id.
82. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (7th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir. 1988) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3190 (1989).
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granted.13 This view is based upon a strict reading of the purpose of the
writ, which concludes that the remedy is "not to reverse these convic-
tions if they are in error, but to overturn them only if justice so
compels.'
The Third Circuit expressed this view in United States v. Osser,85 con-
cluding that the indictment stated a crime, even in light of McNally, be-
cause the petitioner's acts caused the deprivation of property and
monetary loss in addition to the loss of intangible rights. 6 Because these
charges would have been sufficient to convict the petitioner even after the
invalidation of the intangible rights doctrine, Osser concluded that the
writ of coram nobis was not appropriate."1
Several decisions that have reviewed petitions for coram nobis have
drawn a parallel to the habeas corpus remedy, citing Sunal v. Large,88
where the Supreme Court denied habeas corpus to petitioners who had
not directly appealed their convictions.8 9 These holdings reasoned that
the same standard should apply to coram nobis, because a defendant who
has not followed the established appeals procedure has waived his rights,
and may not later assert them at the expense of the stability and predict-
ability of the judicial process. 90
83. See Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1079 (Hall, ., dissenting). The rule that allows a court
to determine whether the indictment could have stated another crime for which the peti-
tioner might have been convicted may be challenged on the grounds that the Constitution
requires that a defendant only bear the consequences of crimes for which he has been
indicted, tried and convicted. See Allen v. United States, 867 F.2d 969, 972 (6th Cir.
1989); Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1075; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,235-37
(1980) (Court declined to decide whether petitioner's conviction could have been upheld
on alternative theory, since that theory was not submitted to jury).
84. Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1079 (Hall, ., dissenting).
85. 864 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1989).
86. See id. at 1063.
87. See id. at 1063-64.
In United States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 236
(1989), the Third Circuit again held that, although the district court had erred in in-
structing the jury that the defendant could be convicted under the intangible rights doc-.
trine alone, the original indictment still charged a valid offense. See id. at 108. The court
conceded that "[a]n error injury instructions is normally remedied by the grant of a new
trial." Id. Nonetheless, because "'a valid conviction could have been had under differ-
ent instructions... [the defect] is not the sort of fundamental defect that produces a
complete miscarriage of justice."' Id. (quoting United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199,
205 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989)).
88. 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
89. See id. at 183-84; United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988);
United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1176 (2d Cir. 1974).
90. See Osser, 864 F.2d at 1060; Travers, 514 F.2d at 1177. But see Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (petitioner's failure to make timely objection to admis-
sion of evidence bars federal habeas corpus review, absent showing of cause for noncom-
pliance and actual prejudice); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (failure to appeal
conviction not procedural default sufficient to deny relief on merits). The tension be-
tween the Wainwright and Fay standards has not been fully resolved.
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3. Exhaustion of Statutory Right of Review Resulting
in No Other Remedy
Certain criteria for the issuance of a writ of coram nobis have been
universally recognized. The Supreme Court has noted that "deliberate
failure to use a known remedy at the time of trial may be a bar to subse-
quent reliance on the defaulted right."91 Therefore, all statutory rights of
review must have been exercised at each stage of the litigation before a
petitioner may be granted a writ of coram nobis.92
In United States v. Mandel,93 the Fourth Circuit concluded that be-
cause the petitioners had appealed their conviction at each stage, no rem-
edy was available to them other than the writ of coram nobis.94 In
United States v. Travers9" the Second Circuit limited the writ of coram
nobis to defendants who had exhausted the appellate process.96 Travers
conceded, however, that the writ might be available to those convicted
after the Second Circuit declined to review the mail fraud statute and
before the Supreme Court had overruled the intangible rights doctrine,
when an appeal would have been futile.97
4. Finality of Judgment
Several decisions have found that the policy of finality of judgment and
the cost of the diversion of scarce prosecutorial resources justify limiting
the availability of the writ of coram nobis.98 This position was strongly
encouraged by the dissent in United States v. Morgan,99 where the jus-
tices stated: "[t]he important principle that means for redressing depri-
vations of constitutional rights should be available often clashes with the
also important principle that at some point a judgment should become
final."100
91. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954).
92. See United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989); Osser, 864
F.2d at 1062; United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989); Travers, 514 F.2d at 1177.
93. 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190-91 (1989).
94. See id. at 1075.
95. 514 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974).
96. See id. at 1177.
97. See id.
In United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit held that
because the defendant had appealed his case at each stage, had filed his petition for a writ
of coram nobis promptly after the McNally decision, and had no other available remedy,
the writ could properly be issued. See id. at 1154. In United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d
1056 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit cited this criterion in refusing to grant a petition
for writ of coram nobis where the petitioner had not raised the intangible rights issue on
appeal. See id. at 1060.
98. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (4th Cir. 1988) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3190 (1989); United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 201 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989).
99. 346 U.S. 502, 513-20 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 519.
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This concern for the finality of judgment has led the Seventh Circuit to
refuse to grant the writ when the basis for its issuance has previously
been litigated. 10' In United States v. Keane, 2 for example, the court
denied a petition for a writ of coram nobis, holding that the petitioners'
legal contention had already been rejected after complete litigation. 3
This was held to justify dismissal even though, as a result of the McNally
decision, there had been an intervening change of law."°
III. THE PROPER CRITERIA FOR ISSUING A WRIT OF CoRAM NOBIS
In determining when the writ of coram nobis should issue, the peti-
tioner's interest in redress must be balanced against the judicial system's
need for finality of judgment. The petitioner's two primary interests in
clearing his record are the potential damage to his reputation and the
possibility of continuing civil disabilities.' 5 The government, on the
other hand, is concerned with ensuring the finality of the judgment
against the petitioner. These governmental concerns are based on an in-
terest in the stability of the judicial system and the efficient use of judicial
resources. 1o6 Moreover, relitigation years after the original trial may
prove unreliable on matters of fact.'07
The writ of coram nobis should be granted when the indictment has
failed to state a crime and the petitioner has exhausted his statutory right
of appeal. Under these circumstances, issuance of the writ would pro-
vide the necessary protection to the petitioner with only a minimal im-
pact on the interest of judicial finality. If the petitioner has failed to
exhaust his statutory remedies, however, he has effectively waived his
rights to them, and should not be allowed to reclaim them at the expense
of judicial stability.
A. The Petitioner's Interest in Clearing the Record
1. Damage to Reputation
Because loss of reputation is a substantial harm, the petitioner con-
victed under an indictment that failed to state a crime has a valid interest
in having his conviction expunged by a writ of coram nobis. Chief Justice
Warren addressed the impact of felony conviction in Parker v. Ellis,08
stating that the "[c]onviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person
which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new
civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his reputation and
101. See Keane, 852 F.2d at 203.
102. 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989).
103. See id. at 206.
104. See id.
105. See infra notes 108-122.
106. See infra notes 123-129.
107. See infra notes 128-129.




economic opportunities."'0 9 The Court expressed a similar concern in
Fiswick v. United States,1" 0 noting that "[the petitioner] would, unless
pardoned, carry through life the disability of a felon."''
An invalid conviction, with its attendant stigma and inevitable conse-
quence of thereafter labeling the petitioner a felon, is an "error-] of the
most fundamental character,... render[ing] the proceeding itself irregu-
lar and invalid.""' Such fundamental error justifies the issuance of a
writ of coram nobis."3
2. Continuing Civil Disabilities
A felony conviction may have substantial impact on the petitioner in
ways that cannot be immediately demonstrated or directly linked to his
felony conviction. For example, he may lose the right to vote or to main-
tain an occupational license. 1 4 The Supreme Court has evaluated the
impact of such continuing civil disabilities in a series of decisions that
consider whether a petitioner's claim for appeal of his conviction is moot
when the criminal judgment has been satisfied." 5
In Fiswick v. United States, 6 the Court held that the alien petitioner's
completed sentence did not moot his appeal of a conviction for conspir-
acy to defraud the United States." 7 The Court stated that the conviction
might have a detrimental effect in future deportation proceedings or on
the petitioner's eligibility for American citizenship."' The Court further
reasoned that "the disability of a felon" put the petitioner at risk of los-
ing certain civil rights, including the rights to serve on a jury, to hold
office, or to vote." 9
In United States v. Morgan,2 ' the Court held that the case was not
moot upon similar grounds, expressing concern that the petitioner's con-
viction might affect his civil rights, or cause future disabilities in the form
of heavier penalties for subsequent convictions.' 2 ' The Court concluded
that "respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that
109. Id. at 593-94 (Warren, C.1., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
110. 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
111. Id. at 222.
112. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914).
113. See id.
114. See United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2109 (1989).
115. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S.
354 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329
U.S. 211 (1946).
116. 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
117. See id. at 221-22.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 222.
120. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
121. See id. at 512-13.
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this conviction was invalid." 122
B. Finality of Judgment
Balanced against the petitioner's interest in exoneration is the govern-
ment's interest in finality of judgment.1 23 While every defendant is enti-
tled to full and fair litigation, there is no right to be afforded multiple
opportunities for relitigation.'24 The need for finality of judgment has
caused the Supreme Court to review collateral attacks on judgments
more stringently than direct attacks.1 25
Requiring a petitioner to challenge his conviction primarily through
direct attack, and only in narrow instances through collateral attack,
promotes the stability of the judicial system and provides an incentive to
present the case fully the first time it is litigated.126 Limitations on col-
lateral attacks also encourage the efficient use of judicial resources.1 27
Moreover, collateral attacks do not guarantee that justice will finally be
satisfied. New litigation, which generally takes place years after the orig-
inal events and initial trial,128 is likely to be "less reliable on questions of
122. Id. at 513.
The Court no longer requires the petitioner to prove a continuing civil disability but
instead presumes its existence. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957).
For example, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court acknowledged "the
obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal
consequences." Id. at 55. The Court held that the possibility of such consequences is
enough to keep a criminal case from becoming moot. See id. For further discussion of
the level of collateral legal consequences necessary to justify post-conviction review, see
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348-53 (1973); Carafas v.LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 237-40 (1968); see also Yackle, supra note 29, at 1001-02 (discussion of "in custody"
requirement).
The Sibron Court further concluded that efficiency and fairness mandate addressing
the issue at once, rather than requiring the petitioner to await demonstrable adverse con-
sequences. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57.
123. Upholding the principle of finality of judgment has been among the deciding fac-
tors in a number of federal court reviews of collateral attacks. In United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that "[olur trial and appellate procedures
are not so unreliable that we may not afford their completed operation any binding effect
beyond the next in a series of endless postconviction collateral attacks. To the contrary, a
final judgment commands respect." Id. at 164-65.
The Supreme Court reviewed the balancing of finality considerations against the retro-
active application of newly decreed constitutional rights in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.
1060 (1989). For a discussion of the evolution of the retroactivity doctrine as applied to
collateral review, see Note, Sixth Amendment-The Evolution of the Supreme Court's
Retroactive Doctrine. A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 1128, 1133-37 (1990).
124. See United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 201 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2109 (1989).
125. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 165 (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184(1979)).
126. See Keane, 852 F.2d at 201.
127. See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1988) (Hall, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989); Keane, 852 F.2d at 201.
128. Petitions filed in the wake of the 1987 McNally decision include those considered
in United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1989) (petitioner convicted in
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fact even if more reliable on questions of law."' 129
C. Proper Balance of Interests
The writ of coram nobis should be issued when the indictment under
which the petitioner was convicted failed to state a crime and the defend-
ant has exhausted statutory review. 30 When the petitioner has appealed
his conviction at each stage of the litigation, he has met the threshold
coram nobis requirement that no other remedy exist. 3' At this point, the
interest in removing the consequences of the felony conviction legiti-
mately outweighs the interest in finality of judgment.
The petition for corain nobis does not require reassessment of the va-
lidity of the petitioner's conviction because a court has already held the
indictment invalid. 3 2 Because the petitioner is merely asking the court
to expunge the already invalid conviction from the record,'33 the interest
in finality of judgment is unaffected. The slight diversion of judicial re-
sources necessary to issue a writ of coram nobis is justified because it is
the only remedy available to satisfy the substantial interest the petitioner
has in having his record expunged.
When the petitioner has not exhausted the statutory right of appeal,
however, the balance of interests shifts in favor of denying the writ of
coram nobis. Because the petitioner has chosen not to avail himself of
the statutory appeal process, he cannot legitimately claim that the writ of
coram nobis is the only means of redress. In such a case, he has not
mininized the impact of his petition upon the interests of judicial final-
ity. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to assist the fact-finding process
by challenging his conviction while the evidence was as fresh as possi-
ble.'3 4 Under these circumstances, the value of finality of judgment
properly outweighs concern for the continuing stigma of a felony
conviction.
CONCLUSION
The writ of coram nobis should be issued when the indictment has
failed to state a crime and the petitioner has exhausted his statutory right
of appeal. In such circumstances, a collateral attack on the conviction is
justified by the petitioner's loss of reputation and the potential civil disa-
1980); United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1057 (3d Cir. 1988) (petitioner convicted in
1972); Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1070 (petitioner convicted in 1977), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3190 (1989); and United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 200 (7th Cir. 1988) (petitioner
convicted in 1974), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2109 (1989).
129. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1989).
130. See Marcello, 876 F.2d at 1154; Allen v. United States, 867 F.2d 969, 972 (6th
Cir. 1989); Mandel, 862 F.2d at 1075; United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1175-77
(2d Cir. 1974).
131. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954).
132. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
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bilities which ensue. These injuries meet the coram nobis criterion of
fundamental error resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice.
M. Diane Duszak

